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SMITH V. CITY OF JACKSON:
SETTING AN UNREASONABLE STANDARD
JESSICA STURGEON
INTRODUCTION
Employment discrimination is often understood to entail
employment policies that explicitly prejudice specific groups. A less
obvious form of discrimination that may be even more insidious,
however, occurs when policies that seem innocent have a disparately
large effect on specific groups of employees. Specifically,
discrimination that is “facially neutral”—that is, not immediately
appearing to favor one class over another—is more difficult to
prevent or eliminate. Congress and the Supreme Court have taken
steps to control facially neutral employment discrimination in some
contexts,1 but the Supreme Court’s decision in Smith v. City of
Jackson demonstrated that the Court does not view all forms of
employment discrimination with equal concern.
2
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employment
practices that are facially neutral but have a disparate impact on a
3
4
protected group of employees. In Smith v. City of Jackson, the
Supreme Court explicitly recognized disparate impact liability in age
5
discrimination cases. In applying the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA), however, the Court applied a
substantially weaker standard than it has applied under Title VII.
Under Title VII, employers could prevail despite engaging in a

Copyright © 2007 by Jessica Sturgeon.
1. See, e.g., Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000)
(“It shall be an unlawful employment practice . . . to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any
individual or to otherwise discriminate against any individual . . . because of such individual’s
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e.
3. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.
4. Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228 (2005).
5. Id. at 232.
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practice that had a disparate impact on a protected group if that
practice passed the business necessity test. Under the ADEA, an
employer, according to the Court, does not need to show that a
discriminatory practice is a business necessity, but only that it is based
6
on a “reasonable factor other than age.” The decision appeared to
help employees by recognizing disparate impact claims, but did so by
embracing a standard that made pursuing such claims extremely
difficult.
This Note argues that although the Court was correct to hold
that disparate impact claims were cognizable under the ADEA, the
limitations that the Court imposed rendered such claims practically
unwinnable. Part I explores the origins of the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act. Part II discusses the development of disparate
impact liability under Title VII and under the ADEA prior to Smith.
Part III discusses the Court’s decision in Smith. Finally, Part IV
addresses the impact of the Smith decision and argues that the
decision effectively foreclosed any disparate impact theory of liability
under the ADEA.
I. ORIGINS OF THE AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT
During congressional debates regarding the Civil Rights Act of
1964, Congress requested a report from the secretary of labor on
“factors which might result in discrimination in employment because
of age and of the consequences of such discrimination on the
economy and individuals affected.”7 The secretary of labor,
W. Willard Wirtz, complied with Congress’s request and issued what
is commonly known as the Wirtz Report. Congress passed the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 19678 in response to the Wirtz
9
Report’s findings. The Wirtz Report addressed four types of
employment discrimination against older employees: (1) dislike or
intolerant feelings unrelated to ability to do work; (2) setting of age
limits beyond which employers will not consider older workers for

6. Id. at 242.
7. Michael C. Harper, ADEA Doctrinal Impediments to the Fulfillment of the Wirtz
Report Agenda, 31 U. RICH. L. REV. 757, 758 (1997) (quoting U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, THE
OLDER AMERICAN WORKER: AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT, REPORT OF THE
SECRETARY OF LABOR TO CONGRESS UNDER SECTION 715 OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964
(1965) [hereinafter WIRTZ REPORT]).
8. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634 (2000).
9. Harper, supra note 7, at 757, 762.
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positions; (3) consideration of facially neutral factors such as health,
adaptability to new technology, and aptitude testing; and (4)
“‘institutional arrangements’ which are ‘designed to protect the
10
employment of older workers while they remain in the work force.’”
Although the Report found that the first category of discrimination
was not prevalent, it concluded that the other three categories of
11
discrimination seemed to have greater prominence in the workplace.
Scholars have dubbed the Report’s second form of age
discrimination, the arbitrary setting of age limits, as “statistical
12
Although statistical discrimination may be
discrimination.”
economically sound to individual employers, the Report indicated
that this type of differentiation between older and younger employees
may be damaging to the aggregate economy.13 Employers assumed
that older employees were less productive and increased labor costs.
As a result, older employees were considered less desirable and
subject to widespread age discrimination.14 The resulting “forced
retirement, unemployment, and underemployment of many
potentially productive older Americans, as well as the aggravation of
the burden of public support for the elderly,” indicated that age
discrimination in the employment context was problematic for the
economy as a whole.15
The Wirtz Report’s third category addressed employment
practices based on factors other than age. Despite being facially
neutral, such practices sometimes had a disproportionate effect on
16
older workers. Factors in employment decisions such as “health,
educational attainment, adaptation to new technology, and aptitude
17
testing” were found to disproportionately affect older workers. This
type of discrimination, according to the Report, is particularly
18
troubling because of the difficulty involved in discovering it.

10. Id. at 758–61 (quoting WIRTZ REPORT, supra note 7, at 2, 15–17).
11. Id.
12. For discussion regarding statistical age discrimination, see, for example, Edmund S.
Phelps, The Statistical Theory of Racism and Sexism, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 659, 659 (1972), and
George Rutherglen, From Race to Age: The Expanding Scope of Employment Discrimination
Law, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 491, 500 (1995).
13. Harper, supra note 7, at 760.
14. Id. at 759–60.
15. Id. at 760.
16. Id. at 761.
17. Id.
18. Id.
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The final category addressed in the Wirtz Report concerned
programs that aimed, in theory, to protect older members of the
workforce but, in practice, sometimes provided an even greater
19
motivation for employers to discriminate against older workers. For
example, programs such as health insurance plans can increase costs
to the employer as their employees age, thus providing an economic
reason for employers consciously to reduce the average age of their
employees.20 Thus, although these programs might appear to benefit
older workers, they may actually contribute to age discrimination by
employers.
The Wirtz Report did not recommend that Congress prohibit all
practices in the third and fourth categories. Rather, it considered
factors in the third category to be demonstrative of “a relationship”
21
between age and job performance. But, even though the Report
indicated some correlation between job performance and age, it also
suggested that the scope of an age discrimination law would need to
go beyond prohibiting overt discrimination to alleviate the impact
22
that age discrimination could have on the aggregate economy.
Under the ADEA, the facially neutral factors from the Wirtz
Report’s third category are the focus of debate over the disparate
impact theory of liability. Until Smith v. City of Jackson, neither
Congress nor the Supreme Court had addressed the availability of
disparate impact claims under the ADEA.23 Nevertheless, in light of
evolving Title VII jurisprudence, numerous courts had already
recognized similar claims under the ADEA, a development explored
more thoroughly in the next part of this Note.

19. Id. at 761–62.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 762 (quoting WIRTZ REPORT, supra note 7, at 2).
22. Id.
23. Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 230 (2005). The words “disparate impact” do not
appear in the ADEA. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634 (2000). In addition, prior to Smith, the Supreme
Court had not opined on the issue. See Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610 (1993)
(“[W]e have never decided whether a disparate impact theory of liability is available under the
ADEA.”).
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II. DEVELOPMENT OF DISPARATE IMPACT THEORY
PRIOR TO SMITH
A. Title VII Disparate Impact Theory
24
In Griggs v. Duke Power Co., the Supreme Court officially
recognized a disparate impact theory of liability under Title VII for
25
the first time. Prior to the enactment of Title VII, Duke Power’s
workforce was segregated, with black employees working in only one
of the five operating departments.26 With the enactment of Title VII,
Duke Power altered its policy to require that applicants have
completed a high school education and have passed two aptitude tests
to qualify for employment in any of the four operating departments
27
previously limited to whites. The Court in Griggs found that
“[n]either [of the tests] was directed or intended to measure the
ability to learn to perform a particular job or category of jobs.”28 The
Court of Appeals had upheld the validity of the tests, finding that
Duke Power had not had a discriminatory purpose in requiring the
tests.29 The Supreme Court, however, reversed the Fourth Circuit’s
decision, holding that Title VII prohibited not only employment
actions that are motivated by prejudice against protected groups but
also employment actions that have an adverse impact on protected
30
groups.
The Court limited the availability of the disparate impact theory
31
of liability, however, by introducing the business necessity test. Not
all adverse impacts, the Court held, were actionable—only those that
“b[ore] [no] demonstrable relationship to successful performance of
the job[]” were prohibited.32 The Griggs Court found that Congress’s
intent to prohibit employment actions that resulted in a disparate

24. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
25. Id. at 432.
26. Id. at 426–27.
27. Id. at 427.
28. Id. at 428.
29. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 420 F.2d 1225, 1232 (4th Cir. 1970), rev’d, 401 U.S. 424
(1971) (“Although . . . we concluded . . . that the educational and testing requirements adopted
by the company continued the effects of . . . prior discrimination, . . . it seems reasonably clear
that this requirement did have a genuine business purpose.”).
30. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431–32 (“The Act proscribes not only overt discrimination but also
practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation.”).
31. Id. at 431.
32. Id.
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impact, in addition to those that constituted disparate treatment, was
33
apparent from the text of Title VII. Because the tests required by
Duke Power had a disparate impact on black applicants and did not
“bear a demonstrable relationship” to job performance, Title VII
prohibited such tests.34
In 1989, the Supreme Court again addressed the issue of
disparate impact theory under Title VII in Wards Cove Packing Co. v.
35
Atonio. A group of nonwhite salmon cannery employees brought
suit under Title VII claiming that several of the employer’s hiring and
promotion procedures, including nepotism, subjective hiring criteria,
and a rehire preference, were racially discriminatory.36 As in Griggs,
the Court recognized the general validity of disparate impact claims
37
under Title VII.
The Court, however, also significantly changed the standard
38
under which it would consider disparate impact claims. Instead of
applying the business necessity test announced in Griggs, the Court
39
announced the business justification test. Under the business
justification test, employers were not required to show “that the
challenged practice [was] ‘essential’ or ‘indispensable’ to the
employer’s business for it to pass muster.”40 Rather, the Court
announced that “[t]he ultimate burden of [persuasion]
remain[ed] . . . at all times” with the disparate impact plaintiff.41 The
defendant only had the burden of production—the employer only had
to assert a particular business justification that could justify the
disparate impact.42 Specifically, plaintiffs were still required to prove
that they suffered an adverse employment action “because of” the
43
protected classification. Yet, for disparate impact plaintiffs to
successfully meet this new burden of persuasion, they also had to

33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
36. Id. at 648–49.
37. Id. at 645–46 (“Under . . . the ‘disparate-impact’ theory, . . . a facially neutral
employment practice may be deemed violative of Title VII without evidence of the employer’s
subjective intent to discriminate.”).
38. Id. at 658–61.
39. Id. at 658.
40. Id. at 659.
41. Id. (quoting Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 997 (1988)).
42. Id. at 660.
43. Id.
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prove that “other tests or selection devices, without a similarly
undesirable [discriminatory] effect, would also serve the employer’s
44
legitimate [hiring] interest[s].” Unless the plaintiff could show that
the employer could have served their legitimate hiring interest in a
way that would not have a disparate impact on older workers, the
plaintiff could not prevail.45 The Court held that the employees in
Wards Cove had failed to meet the more stringent requirements of
the business justification test and reversed the Ninth Circuit’s
decision.46
Displeased with the decision in Wards Cove, Congress acted
quickly to amend Title VII to match more closely the interpretation
of disparate impact claims from Griggs.47 First, Congress reenacted
the business necessity test, legislatively overturning the more
employer-friendly business justification test.48 Second, Congress
restored the burdens set forth in Griggs, requiring that the employer
49
prove any business necessity defense it raised. Finally, the Civil
Rights Act of 1991 abolished the requirement, set forth in Wards
Cove, that a disparate impact plaintiff identify the specific
employment practice that caused the disparate impact.50 Instead, a
plaintiff could prevail on a disparate impact claim under Title VII by
showing that the decisionmaking process as a whole resulted in a
disparate impact on employees in a protected class.51
44. Id. (second and third alterations in original) (quoting Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody,
422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975)).
45. Id.
46. Id. at 661.
47. Douglas C. Herbert & Lani Schweiker Shelton, A Pragmatic Argument Against
Applying the Disparate Impact Doctrine in Age Discrimination Cases, 37 S. TEX. L. REV. 625,
631 (1996).
48. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A) (2000) (“An unlawful
employment practice based on disparate impact is established under this subchapter only if a
complaining party demonstrates that a respondent uses a particular employment practice that
causes a disparate impact on the basis of [an unlawful classification] and the respondent fails to
demonstrate that the challenged practice is job related for the position in question and
consistent with business necessity.”).
49. For the language of the statute, see § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i).
50. See id. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(B)(i) (“[T]he complaining party shall demonstrate that each
particular challenged employment practice causes a disparate impact, except that if the
complaining party can demonstrate to the court that the elements of a respondent’s
decisionmaking process are not capable of separation for analysis, the decisionmaking process
may be analyzed as one employment practice.”). For the business necessity test, see Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971); for the business justification test, see Wards Cove
Packing Co., 490 U.S. at 659.
51. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(B)(i).
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B. ADEA Disparate Impact Theory
Following the Court’s decision in Griggs, many courts
interpreted that decision to apply to the ADEA, in addition to Title
VII, and, accordingly, recognized disparate impact claims under the
ADEA.52 Among the first to do so was the Court of Appeals for the
53
Second Circuit in Geller v. Markham. In the Geller decision, the
Second Circuit cited Supreme Court precedent as justification for
applying the disparate impact theory of liability recognized under
54
Title VII to the ADEA. Not all courts, however, were so eager to
apply Title VII’s disparate impact liability under the ADEA.55
Furthermore, not all Supreme Court Justices were amenable to such
claims. Ten years after Griggs, in his dissent to the denial of certiorari
in Geller, Justice Rehnquist opined that the ADEA, unlike Title VII,
did not support disparate impact claims and noted that the Supreme
Court had never actually addressed the issue.56
The standard used by courts that recognized disparate impact
claims under the ADEA continued to evolve as the standard for
evaluating such claims under Title VII changed. Indeed, despite the
fact that Griggs and Wards Cove both construed Title VII, rather than
57
the ADEA, some courts continued to rely on these cases when
evaluating disparate impact claims.58 Following the Griggs decision,
all courts to consider the issue recognized the availability of a

52. See, e.g., EEOC v. Borden’s Inc., 724 F.2d 1390, 1394–95 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that a
disparate impact claim exists under the ADEA); Leftwich v. Harris-Stowe State College, 702
F.2d 686, 690 (8th Cir. 1983) (describing the elements of a prima facie case for disparate impact
age discrimination); Geller v. Markham, 635 F.2d 1027, 1030 (2d Cir. 1980) (applying the
principles of Griggs to hold employer liable when a fifty-five-year-old teacher was denied
employment, in favor of a younger teacher, to avoid a higher pay grade).
53. 635 F.2d at 1027.
54. Id. at 1030 (citing Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 584 (1978)).
55. See, e.g., Adams v. Fla. Power Corp., 255 F.3d 1322, 1326 (11th Cir. 2001) (“[W]e find
that disparate impact claims may not be brought under the ADEA . . . .”); Massarsky v. General
Motors, Corp., 706 F.2d 111, 120 (3d Cir. 1983) (“Although the Second Circuit has expressly
recognized the disparate impact doctrine in the ADEA context, this court has never ruled on
whether a plaintiff can establish a violation of the Act by showing disparate impact alone.”
(citation omitted)); see also Herbert & Shelton, supra note 47, at 630 (citing cases which did not
find disparate impact liability under the ADEA).
56. Markham v. Geller, 451 U.S. 945, 947 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from the denial
of cert.), denying cert. to 635 F.2d 1027 (2d Cir. 1980).
57. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 645 (1989); Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., 401 U.S. 424, 425 (1971).
58. Herbert & Shelton, supra note 47, at 631–34.
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59
disparate impact theory of liability under the ADEA. Such a view
was justified by the similarities between Title VII and the ADEA.60
Following the Wards Cove decision, many courts continued to
recognize a disparate impact theory of liability under the ADEA, but
applied the more employer-friendly business justification test to those
claims.61 The amendments to the Civil Rights Act which restored the
more employee-friendly business necessity test from Griggs had little
effect on disparate impact claims under the ADEA because courts
declined to address the issue.62
In 1993, the Supreme Court addressed the developing ADEA
disparate impact case law and asserted in Hazen Paper Co. v.
Biggins63 that it had never decided whether disparate impact claims
were available under the ADEA.64 In Hazen, an employee brought
suit alleging that his employer fired him to keep his pension from
65
vesting, thereby violating the ADEA. The Court held that “there is
no disparate treatment under the ADEA when the factor motivating
the employer is some feature other than the employee’s age.”66

59. E.g., Monroe v. United Airlines, Inc., 736 F.2d 394, 407 (7th Cir. 1984); EEOC v.
Borden’s, Inc., 724 F.2d 1390, 1394 (9th Cir. 1984); Allison v. W. Union Tel. Co., 680 F.2d 1318,
1323 (11th Cir. 1982).
60. See, e.g., Geller v. Markham, 635 F.2d 1027, 1032 (2d Cir. 1980) (“Although the ADEA
did not adopt Title VII’s procedural rules entirely, the rule permitting a case to be established
by a showing of discriminatory impact or treatment cannot reasonably be viewed as merely
procedural.”).
61. See, e.g., Evers v. Alliant Techsystems, Inc., 241 F.3d 948, 953–54 (8th Cir. 2001) (“A
plaintiff in a disparate impact case must first establish a prima facie case of disparate impact by
identifying a specific employment practice and then presenting statistical evidence of a kind and
degree sufficient to show that the practice in question caused the plaintiff to suffer adverse
employment action because of his or her membership in a protected group.”); Lowe v.
Commack Union Free Sch. Dist., 886 F.2d 1364, 1370 (2d Cir. 1989) (“‘[T]he plaintiff must offer
statistical evidence of a kind and degree sufficient to show that the practice in question has
caused the exclusion of applicants for jobs or promotions because of their membership in a
protected group.’” (quoting Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 994 (1988))).
62. See, e.g., Fisher v. Transco Services-Milwaukee, Inc., 979 F.2d 1239, 1245 n.4 (7th Cir.
1992) (“[R]eversal is required in this appeal regardless of . . . whether the [Civil Rights Act of
1991] affects the ADEA at all.”); Caron v. Scott Paper Co., 834 F. Supp. 33, 39 n.5 (D. Me.
1993) (“[I]t is unnecessary to reach the issue of the effect of the 1991 amendments to Title VII
on ADEA claims.”); Libront v. Columbus McKinnon Corp., No. 83-CV-858S, 1992 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 19029, at *8 n.2 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 23, 1992) (“This Court need not presently decide
whether the [Civil Rights Act of 1991] changes the burdens of proof in ADEA actions.”).
63. Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604 (1993).
64. Id. at 610 (“[W]e have never decided whether a disparate impact theory of liability is
available under the ADEA.”).
65. Id. at 606–07.
66. Id. at 609.
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Because the employee alleged that his employer dismissed him to
prevent his pension benefits from vesting, not on account of his age,
the Court remanded the case for a jury to consider whether age was a
67
motivating factor in the employee’s termination.
Following the decision in Hazen, a circuit split developed, with
68
some courts not allowing disparate impact claims under the ADEA,
69
some allowing such claims, and still others remaining undecided.70
Although the Fifth Circuit had not addressed the issue until Smith v.
71
City of Jackson, its decision led the Supreme Court to definitively
assert the existence of a disparate impact claim under the ADEA.72
III. SMITH V. CITY OF JACKSON
A. Fifth Circuit and Supreme Court Decisions
In October 1998, the city of Jackson, Mississippi enacted a plan
to increase the salaries of all city employees.73 One of the purposes of
the pay raise plan was to make the salaries of city workers
74
competitive with other public employers in the Southeast. By

67. Id. at 610–12.
68. See, e.g., Mullin v. Raytheon Co., 164 F.3d 696, 700–01 (1st Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528
U.S. 811 (1999) (declining to recognize a disparate impact theory of liability under the ADEA);
Maier v. Lucent Tech., Inc., 120 F.3d 730, 735 (7th Cir. 1997) (“We have held that [a disparate
impact] theory of liability is not cognizable under the ADEA.”); Ellis v. United Airlines, Inc., 73
F.3d 999, 1004 (10th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1245 (1996) (holding that a plaintiff must
prove that age was actually the motivating factor behind the adverse employment action).
69. See, e.g., Smith v. Xerox Corp., 196 F.3d 358, 367 (2d Cir. 1999) (evaluating disparate
impact claims based on age together with a disparate impact claim based on gender because
“[t]his Court generally assesses claims brought under the ADEA identically to those brought
pursuant to Title VII, including disparate impact claims”); Arnett v. Cal. Pub. Employees Ret.
Sys., 179 F.3d 690, 697 (9th Cir. 1999) (following its own precedent expressly reaffirming
disparate impact theory despite Hazen opinion); Dist. Council 37, AFSCME v. New York City
Dep’t of Parks and Recreation, 113 F.3d 347, 351 (2d Cir. 1997) (same); Smith v. City of Des
Moines, 99 F.3d 1466, 1470 (8th Cir. 1996) (same).
70. See, e.g., Koger v. Reno, 98 F.3d 631, 639 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (“We assume without
deciding that disparate impact analysis applies to age discrimination claims.”); Lyon v. Ohio
Educ. Ass’n and Prof’l Staff Union, 53 F.3d 135, 139 n.5 (6th Cir. 1995) (“There is considerable
doubt as to whether a claim of age discrimination may exist under a disparate-impact theory.”);
DiBiase v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 48 F.3d 719, 732 (3d Cir. 1995) (“[I]n the wake of
Hazen, it is doubtful that traditional disparate impact theory is a viable theory of liability under
the ADEA.”).
71. Smith v. City of Jackson, 351 F.3d 183, 184 (5th Cir. 2003).
72. Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 231 (2005).
73. Id. at 231.
74. Id.

05__STURGEON.DOC

2007]

6/7/2007 4:14 PM

AGE DISCRIMINATION

1387

enacting the plan, the city hoped to “attract and retain qualified
people, provide incentive for performance, maintain competitiveness
with other public sector agencies and ensure equitable compensation
75
to all employees regardless of age, sex, race and/or disability.”
76
In May 1999, the city revised the plan. Under the revised plan,
the city granted police officers who had been with the department for
less than five years proportionally higher raises than those who had
been city police officers for five years or more.77 Although 66.2
percent of officers under forty received more than a 10 percent
increase in pay, only 45.3 percent of officers over forty received such
raises.78
Due to the discrepancies between the raises which older officers
and younger officers received, a group of Jackson police officers aged
forty and above filed a suit under the ADEA, claiming both disparate
treatment and disparate impact.79 Petitioners claimed that the city’s
plan disproportionately benefited younger workers.80 The district
court found that petitioners had failed to show an unlawful
discriminatory motive on the city’s part and dismissed the disparate
treatment claim.81 The district court also dismissed the disparate
impact claim, holding that the ADEA did not support disparate
82
impact claims. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit vacated the disparate
treatment claim, remanding for further discovery on that issue, but
affirmed the district court’s holding regarding the disparate impact
claim.83 The United States Supreme Court granted the petition for
certiorari on the disparate impact issue.84 In Smith v. City of Jackson,
the Supreme Court concluded that the ADEA did support a disparate

75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 242.
79. Smith v. City of Jackson, Civ. A. No. 3:01-CV-367BN, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27284, at
*3–4 (S.D. Miss. Sept. 6, 2002), vacated, 351 F.3d 183 (5th Cir. 2003), aff’d on other grounds, 544
U.S. 228 (2005).
80. Smith, 544 U.S. at 231.
81. Smith, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27284, at *13.
82. Id. at *17.
83. Smith v. City of Jackson, 351 F.3d 183, 184–85, 198 (5th Cir. 2003), aff’d on other
grounds, 544 U.S. 228 (2005).
84. Smith v. City of Jackson, 541 U.S. 958 (2004).
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impact claim, but affirmed the lower court’s dismissal of the officer’s
85
disparate impact claim.
In announcing the opinion of the Court, Justice Stevens’s
plurality opinion began by addressing the nexus between the ADEA
86
and Title VII. Justice Stevens explained that the ADEA makes it
unlawful for an employer
to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual’s age; [or] to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in
any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as
87
an employee, because of such individual’s age.

Comparing relevant text, the use of “age” in the ADEA, rather than
88
“race, color, religion, sex, or national origin,” as in Title VII, is the
only difference between § 623(a) of the ADEA and § 2000e-2(a) of
89
Title VII. Furthermore, both statutes contain an exception allowing
“otherwise prohibited” employment practices if the guiding factor is a
“bona fide occupational qualification” (hereinafter BFOQ).90 The
91
ADEA, however, has a more limited scope than Title VII. In
particular, the ADEA not only contains an exception for BFOQs, but
also allows differential treatment based on “reasonable factors other
than age” (hereinafter RFOA).92
Justice Stevens reasoned that when two statutes contain similar
language, serve similar ends, and are enacted in close proximity to
one another, Congress must have meant for the two statutes to have

85. Smith, 544 U.S. at 231–32.
86. Id. at 232.
87. Id. at 232–33 (citing Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C.
§ 623(a) (2000)).
88. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000).
89. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 623(a), with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
90. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e). A BFOQ is a characteristic which is
essentially required for an employee to do his or her job. For example, hiring a male actor to
portray a male role is not prohibited sex discrimination. In contrast, a pilot does not necessarily
need to be under a particular age. However, a pilot does need to be able to see. An employment
policy requiring that qualification would likely have a disparate impact on older workers, given
that such a requirement would be based on a “reasonable factor other than age,” and therefore
not prohibited by the ADEA.
91. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 623(f), with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e).
92. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (2000).
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93
the same general meaning. Following from that premise, Justice
Stevens relied on Griggs, Hazen, the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) and Department of Labor’s interpretations of
Title VII and the ADEA, and the inclusion of the RFOA provision in
the ADEA to find that a disparate impact theory of liability is
available under the ADEA.94 For instance, the Griggs Court found
that “Congress had ‘directed the thrust of the Act to the consequences
of employment practices, not simply the motivation,’” and held that a
plaintiff was not required to show discriminatory intent in order to
95
recover under Title VII. Justice Stevens argued that Congress
likewise intended that the ADEA address the effects of employment
practices.96
Beyond finding analogical support for a disparate impact cause
of action under the ADEA, Justice Stevens also found independent
indications that the ADEA allowed for liability under a disparate
impact theory.97 He noted that the Department of Labor, which
originally drafted the ADEA, and the EEOC, which was the agency
responsible for implementing the ADEA, had both recognized the
availability of a disparate impact theory under the ADEA.98
Finally, Justice Stevens reasoned that the inclusion of an RFOA
provision in the ADEA did not make sense unless a disparate impact
99
theory of liability was cognizable under the Act. If the ADEA was
meant to allow only disparate treatment claims, Justice Stevens
reasoned, the RFOA provision would have no effect because only
employment policies which explicitly addressed age would be
100
Under § 623(a), employers are prohibited from
covered.
discriminating against employees on the basis of the employees’
age.101 The inclusion of a reasonable factor other than age exception is
logical only if disparate impact claims are recognized under the
102
ADEA. Based on the Court’s holding in Griggs, the EEOC and

93. Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 233 (2005).
94. Id. at 233–40.
95. Id. at 234 (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971)).
96. Id. at 235.
97. Id. at 236–38.
98. Id. at 239–40.
99. Id. at 238–39.
100. See id. at 239 (“Rather than support an argument that disparate impact is unavailable
under the ADEA, the RFOA provision actually supports the contrary conclusion.”).
101. Id. at 233.
102. Id. at 238–39.
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Department of Labor’s interpretations of both Title VII and the
ADEA, and the inclusion of the RFOA provision, Justice Stevens
reasoned that recovery was available for disparate impact claims
103
under the ADEA.
Although Justice Stevens held that recovery based on a disparate
impact is allowable under the ADEA, he also held that disparate
impact liability thereunder was much more limited than disparate
104
impact liability under Title VII. The addition of the “reasonable
factor other than age” provision in the ADEA and the amendment to
Title VII in the Civil Rights Act of 1991 led the Court to find that
Congress intended the availability of disparate impact claims under
105
the ADEA to be significantly more narrow.
The Court highlighted the difference between the ADEA and
106
Title VII by reference to the Civil Rights Act of 1991. Following the
Court’s decision in Wards Cove, Congress amended Title VII to
expand the scope of disparate impact liability under Title VII to its
pre-Wards Cove level.107 Congress, however, did not make these
amendments to the ADEA.108 The Court reasoned that, without the
amendment to scale back the Wards Cove decision, the holding in
109
Wards Cove governs disparate impact liability under the ADEA.
Additionally, the Court focused on the inclusion of the RFOA
provision in the ADEA and its absence from Title VII.110 The
inclusion of the RFOA provision highlights the difference between
the relevance of age as a factor in employment and the relevance of
race, sex, religion, or other Title VII-protected classifications in
111
employment practices. Because, Justice Stevens reasoned, some
entirely legitimate and necessary employment requirements will have
a greater negative impact on older workers than on younger workers,
the RFOA provision was necessary to account for the real impact that
age can have on an employee.112

103. Id. at 239–40.
104. Id. at 240.
105. Id. at 240–41.
106. Id. at 240.
107. Id.; see supra note 50 and accompanying text.
108. Smith, 544 U.S. at 240.
109. See id. (“Hence, Wards Cove’s pre-1991 interpretation of Title VII’s identical language
remains applicable to the ADEA.”).
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 240–41.
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In applying this rule, Justice Stevens found that the actual pay
113
plan in Jackson, Mississippi did not violate the ADEA. The city’s
plan based raises solely on position and seniority.114 Though officers
with less seniority did receive proportionately higher raises than those
with more seniority, the city explained the difference based on their
“perceived need to raise the salaries of junior officers to make them
115
competitive with comparable positions in the market.” Justice
Stevens found this justification reasonable, though he conceded that
there may have been other reasonable ways to achieve the city’s goal,
making it clear that the Court was not using the business necessity
test.116 Instead, Justice Stevens was using a more employer-friendly
reasonableness standard to determine the validity of disparate impact
117
claims under the ADEA.
Justices Antonin Scalia and Sandra Day O’Connor both
concurred, separately, in the judgment. Justice Scalia concurred in the
judgment and joined all of Stevens’s opinion except the portion using
Griggs, textual similarities between the ADEA and Title VII, and the
existence of the RFOA provision in the ADEA as independent
118
justifications for finding disparate impact liability under the ADEA.
Justice Scalia did agree that a disparate impact theory of liability was
available under the ADEA, but believed that recognizing such claims
was appropriate because the EEOC’s construction of the statute
deserved judicial deference.119 The ADEA granted authority to the
EEOC to set forth “‘such rules and regulations as it may consider
120
necessary or appropriate for carrying out’ the ADEA.” Pursuant to
the ADEA, the EEOC issued a regulation proclaiming that
employment practices that had an adverse impact on individuals over
the age of forty, but were based on a reasonable factor other than
age, were acceptable under the ADEA only if they were justified as a

113. Id. at 241–42.
114. Id. at 242.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 243.
117. Id. The reasonableness standard the Court used in Smith has since been applied as the
“business justification test.” See, e.g., Meachum v. Knolls Atomic Power Lab., 461 F.3d 134, 141
(2d Cir. 2006) (“The best reading of the text of the ADEA—in light of City of Jackson and
Wards Cove—is that the plaintiff bears the burden of persuading the factfinder that the
employer’s justification is unreasonable.”).
118. Smith, 544 U.S. at 242–45 (Scalia, J., concurring).
119. Id.
120. Id. at 243 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 628 (2000)).
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121
business necessity. Justice Scalia argued that “[e]ven under . . .
unduly constrained standards of agency deference,” the EEOC’s
interpretation of the ADEA to include a disparate impact claim
122
warranted deference from the Court. Therefore, in Justice Scalia’s
view, the EEOC’s regulations indicating that there was a disparate
impact claim under the ADEA ought to be controlling.123
Although Justice O’Connor also concurred in the judgment in
Smith, she, along with Justices Kennedy and Thomas, would have
affirmed the Court of Appeals’s dismissal of the officers’ claim
because the ADEA does not allow for recovery based on a disparate
impact theory of liability.124 Justice O’Connor used the “ADEA’s text,
legislative history, and purposes” to conclude that “Congress did not
125
intend the [ADEA] to authorize [disparate impact] claims.”
Both § 623(a)(1) and § 623(a)(2), the two provisions in the ADEA
that define conduct prohibited under the statute, forbid employment
actions that have an adverse effect on an individual “because of such
individual’s age.”126 Justice O’Connor interpreted the inclusion of this
language as Congress’s intent to make employers liable for adverse
actions against individuals only when those actions were “motivated
by the individual’s age.”127 In Justice O’Connor’s view, paragraph
(a)(2) did not mean that the ADEA supported a disparate impact
claim but rather that any facially neutral policy had to be intended to
have an adverse effect as a result of the employee’s age to violate the
128
ADEA.
Additionally, Justice O’Connor interpreted the inclusion of the
RFOA provision as Congress’s intent to “‘insure[] that employers
[are] permitted to use neutral criteria’ other than age even if this

121. Id. at 243–44.
122. Id. at 244–45 (citing United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001)). According to
the Court, “Chevron recognized that Congress . . . engages in express delegation of specific
interpretive authority . . . .” Mead, 533 U.S. at 229 (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res.
Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984)). “We have recognized a very good indicator of
delegation meriting Chevron treatment in express congressional authorizations to engage in the
process of rulemaking or adjudication that produces regulations or rulings for which deference
is claimed.” Id. (citing EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 257 (1991)).
123. Smith, 544 U.S. at 244–47 (Scalia, J., concurring).
124. Id. at 248 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
125. Id.
126. Id. at 248–49.
127. Id. at 249.
128. Id.
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129
results in a disparate adverse impact on older workers.” The RFOA
provision should be viewed, according to Justice O’Connor, as an
indication that Congress intended to protect against age
130
discrimination only where there was intentional discrimination.
Justice O’Connor also highlighted the legislative history of the
ADEA as justification for her argument that the ADEA did not
131
support a disparate impact theory of liability. Because the Wirtz
Report was the model for the ADEA, and that report indicated that
intentionally disparate treatment of individuals based on age was the
true concern, Justice O’Connor understood the ADEA to prohibit
intentional age discrimination (or disparate treatment) but not to
forbid employment practices that only have a disparate impact on
older employees.132

B. Analysis of the Various Opinions in Smith
The Court’s decision in Smith that a disparate impact theory of
liability existed under the ADEA is well-supported. The inclusion of
the RFOA provision, the similarities between the ADEA and Title
VII, and the EEOC and Department of Labor’s interpretations of the
ADEA all indicate that Congress intended that a disparate impact
theory of liability be available under the ADEA.
First, the inclusion of the RFOA provision in the ADEA, despite
its exclusion from Title VII, supports a reading of the ADEA to allow
133
for disparate impact claims. As Justice Stevens pointed out in the
plurality portion of his opinion, the RFOA provision would not be
essential to the ADEA if Congress had not contemplated a disparate
impact claim under the statute.134 The structure of the statute supports
Stevens’s reasoning.135
129. Id. at 251 (quoting EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 232–33 (1983)).
130. Id.
131. Id. at 253–56.
132. Id. at 254–56.
133. Id. at 238–40 (majority opinion).
134. Id. at 238–39.
135. A disparate treatment claim requires both a classification on the basis of age and
discriminatory intent, but disparate impact claims challenge facially neutral actions. See Brett
Ira Johnson, Note, Six of One, Half-Dozen of Another: Mullin v. Raytheon Co. as a
Representative of Federal Circuit Courts Erroneously Distinguishing the ADEA from Title VII
Regarding Disparate Impact Liability, 36 IDAHO L. REV. 303, 305–06 (2000) (describing the
elements of disparate treatment and disparate impact claims). Even when an action is otherwise
prohibited, employers are not liable for actions based on a reasonable factor other than age
(facially neutral actions). Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (2000).
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liability in age discrimination cases than Title VII does when
employer policies have a disparate impact on the classes it protects. If
an employment policy has a disparate impact on women but that
policy is based on a reasonable factor other than sex, the employer
can only defend that policy under Title VII by showing that it was
necessary for his or her business. If an employment policy is based on
a reasonable factor other than age and has a disparate impact on
older workers, the employer only has to show that the policy is
reasonable to prevail under the ADEA. Despite this difference in
language between the ADEA and Title VII, the ADEA supports a
disparate impact theory of liability. As Justice Stevens pointed out in
the plurality opinion, if the ADEA had not been written with the
intent to support disparate impact claims, the very inclusion of the
RFOA provision probably would not have been necessary.141
The other difference between the ADEA and Title VII, the
amendment to Title VII enacted by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, also
does not justify excluding disparate impact claims under the ADEA.
Following Wards Cove, Congress acted to restore the business
necessity test that had governed disparate impact claims under Title
142
VII prior to the Wards Cove decision. The 1991 amendments to
Title VII were not accompanied by corresponding changes to the
ADEA. However, Wards Cove was a Title VII decision, not a
decision under the ADEA.143 Given that, at the time of the Civil
Rights Act of 1991, the Supreme Court had never specifically
addressed disparate impact claims under the ADEA and that EEOC
regulations regarding the ADEA specified that the business necessity
test applied to disparate impact claims under the ADEA, Congress
understandably amended only Title VII and not the ADEA.
Finally, the EEOC and Department of Labor’s interpretations of
the ADEA supporting a disparate impact theory of liability warrant
144
significant deference from the Court. Section 628 of the ADEA
reads:

141. Smith, 544 U.S. at 238–39.
142. Sarah Benjes, Comment, Smith v. City of Jackson: A Pretext of Victory for Employees,
83 DENV. U. L. REV. 231, 236 (2005).
143. See Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 648 (1989) (“All . . . claims were
advanced under both the disparate-treatment and disparate-impact theories of Title VII
liability.”).
144. Smith, 544 U.S. at 244–45 (Scalia, J., concurring).

05__STURGEON.DOC

1396

6/7/2007 4:14 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 56:1377

[T]he Equal Employment Opportunity Commission may issue such
rules and regulations as it may consider necessary or appropriate for
carrying out [the Age Discrimination in Employment] chapter, and
may establish such reasonable exemptions to and from any or all
provisions of this chapter as it may find necessary and proper in the
145
public interest.

The Court has consistently granted deference to administrative
agencies’ reasonable statutory interpretations, particularly in
situations in which Congress entrusted the agency to administer the
program.146 Agency implementations of ambiguous statutes generally
receive wide latitude from courts unless those implementations are
147
unreasonable. Given that § 628 clearly confers upon the EEOC
authority to administer the ADEA,148 the agency’s interpretation
should be binding on the Court under Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc.,149 and the EEOC’s regulations
implementing the ADEA make it clear that a disparate impact claim
150
should be recognized.
IV. THE IMPACT OF SMITH
Although the Court’s recognition of a disparate impact claim
under the ADEA is well-grounded, the restrictions that it placed on
disparate impact claims under the ADEA rendered the theory of
liability all but useless to employees. Under Smith, conduct that is

145. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 628 (2000).
146. See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–44
(1984) (“The power of an administrative agency to administer a congressionally
created . . . program necessarily requires the formulation of policy and the making of rules to fill
any gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by Congress. If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the
agency to fill, there is an express delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific
provision of the statute by regulation. Such legislative regulations are given controlling weight
unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.” (internal quotations
and citations omitted)).
147. Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 740–41 (1996). The Court explained,
“Congress, when it left ambiguity in a statute meant for implementation by an agency,
understood that the ambiguity would be resolved, first and foremost, by the agency, and desired
the agency (rather than the courts) to possess whatever degree of discretion the ambiguity
allows.” Id.
148. 29 U.S.C. § 628 (2000).
149. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. at 843–44; see supra
note 146.
150. See Age Discrimination in Employment Act Interpretations, 29 C.F.R. § 1625.7(d)
(2004).

05__STURGEON.DOC

2007]

6/7/2007 4:14 PM

AGE DISCRIMINATION

1397

otherwise prohibited because it has a disparate impact on older
employees is permissible if the practice is based on a “reasonable
factor other than age.” An employer who invokes a “reasonable
factor other than age” need only show a business justification for
making decisions based on that “reasonable factor.”
Lower courts applying the business justification test and reading
the RFOA provision broadly, as required by Smith, have generally
151
dismissed employees’ complaints during the pleading stage. These
cases indicate two things: first, though courts have consistently
refused to allow disparate impact claims under the ADEA, their
methods of rejecting these claims have varied widely because the
Court’s reasoning in Smith was so vague; second, the Court’s
interpretation of the RFOA provision has rendered disparate impact
claims futile.
The Court’s holding in Smith has rendered success under the
disparate impact theory of liability under the ADEA unlikely for two
reasons: first, because the Court only vaguely defined the scope of the
RFOA exception, and second, because the Court required extreme
specificity in pointing out which employment practice resulted in the
alleged disparate impact. The Court has required plaintiffs to identify
a “specific employment practice.”152 However, to this point, disparate
impact plaintiffs have had difficulty satisfying this stringent standard
153
154
of specificity. For example, in Rizzo v. PPL Service Corp., the
plaintiff alleged that an internal investigation by her employer, which
resulted in mostly older employees being terminated, was an
employment practice that had a disparate impact on employees over
forty.155 The District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
found, however, that the practice named by the plaintiff was
insufficient: “Plaintiffs cannot show that the investigation was a
specific employment practice that illegally disparately impacted older

151. Benjes, supra note 142, at 253.
152. Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 241 (2005).
153. Aida M. Alaka, Corporate Reorganizations, Job Layoffs, and Age Discrimination: Has
Smith v. City of Jackson Substantially Expanded the Rights of Older Workers under the ADEA?,
70 ALB. L. REV. 143, 169–70 (2006) (“Smith could not salvage plaintiffs’ disparate impact claims
[because] plaintiffs failed to identify with specificity the policy or practice responsible for the
alleged disparate impact . . . .”).
154. Rizzo v. PPL Serv. Corp., No. 03-5779, No. 03-5780, No. 03-5781, 2005 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 11457 (E.D. Pa. June 10, 2005).
155. Id. at *13–14.
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156
employees.” The level of specificity required under Smith can be
exceedingly difficult for a plaintiff to meet because employees may
not know the specific policies behind their employer’s actions. Yet
without being able to point to specific practices, plaintiffs cannot
prevail.
In addition, many plaintiffs have been unsuccessful because
courts have found an RFOA for the challenged employment practice.
157
For example, in Rollins v. Clear Creek Independent School District,
the District Court for the Southern District of Texas held that the
plaintiff did not have a viable disparate impact claim because the
defendant’s practices were based on a reasonable factor other than
age: “Defendant based its policy on Plaintiff’s retirement status and
its desire to give nonretired teachers who were not drawing a
retirement salary preference.”158 In Rollins, the plaintiff suffered an
adverse employment action due to a policy that had a disparate
impact on older workers. That policy was justified by the defendant’s
purely monetary concerns.159 The court acknowledged that this
outcome differed from what it would have been pre-Smith: “Under
Smith, Defendant is not required to show that there are no other ways
of remaining in compliance with the requirement, as it would under
the Title VII business necessity test; it is simply required to show that
‘the [method] selected was not unreasonable.’”160 This broad
interpretation of the RFOA provision severely limits the usefulness
of the disparate impact theory of liability to ADEA plaintiffs.
161
In Meachum v. Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory, the Second
Circuit ruled against the plaintiff in a disparate impact claim brought
162
under the ADEA. Despite substantial evidence that a workforce
reduction resulted in a disparate impact on older workers, the court

156. Id. at *14.
157. Rollins v. Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., No. G-06-081, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82511
(S.D. Tex. Nov. 13, 2006).
158. Id. at *17; see also Townsend v Weyerhaeuser Co., No. 04-C-563-C, 2005 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 11767, at *39 (W.D. Wis. June 13, 2005) (“[A]ssuming that reductions in force result in
disproportionate numbers of over-40 employees being terminated, an employer would not incur
liability under the ADEA as a matter of course. . . . Certainly, an employer that decides to
terminate an employee to relieve itself of the burden of that employee’s high salary or health
care costs has based its decision on ‘reasonable factors’ other than the employee’s age.”).
159. See Rollins, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82511, at *17–18 (discussing the validity of the
school’s choice to prefer those teachers who were not also drawing retirement salaries).
160. Id. at *18 (quoting Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 243 (2005)).
161. Meachum v. Knolls Atomic Power Lab., 461 F.3d 134 (2d Cir. 2006).
162. Id. at 138.
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held that the plaintiff had not shown that the employer’s actions were
163
unreasonable. In its holding, the Second Circuit acknowledged the
high burden that Smith placed on ADEA plaintiffs claiming disparate
impact discrimination:
There is some force to this argument [that the business necessity test
should be used], but it does not withstand [Smith], which
emphasized that there are reasonable and permissible employment
criteria that correlate with age. . . . It is therefore hard to see how an
ADEA plaintiff can expect to prevail on a showing of disparate
impact based on a factor that correlates with age without also
164
demonstrating that the factor is unreasonable.

Because of the holding in Smith, the RFOA exception must be
interpreted broadly, meaning that ADEA plaintiffs essentially cannot
succeed on a disparate impact theory of liability. Employers can
justify employment practices that have a disparate impact on older
workers with reasons that would be unacceptable if the employer
tried to use those same reasons to justify employment practices that
have a disparate impact on groups protected under Title VII.
Although many legitimate employment practices could have a
disparate impact on older workers, the Court’s relaxation of the
standard for judging such practices from necessity to simple
reasonableness has created an easy way for employers to avoid
liability under the ADEA.
Thus, the Court’s decision in Smith has created an inconsistency
between the Court’s interpretations of Title VII and the ADEA. This
is especially problematic given that the Court has repeatedly pointed
to the textual similarities between the two statutes and used their
interpretation of one statute to justify an outcome relating to the
other. Under Title VII, employers cannot justify employment
practices that have an adverse disparate impact on a protected group
with purely financial justifications.165 Rather, an employer must justify
an employment action, if it has a disparate impact on a protected
166
group, as a bona fide occupational qualification. In addition to an

163. Id. at 146.
164. Id. at 142–43.
165. See Wilson v. Sw. Airlines Co., 517 F. Supp. 292, 302 (N.D. Tex. 1981) (explaining that
an employer cannot turn a protected status into a BFOQ by choosing to exploit that status for
profitability).
166. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (2000); see Wilson, 517 F. Supp. at 297
(describing the BFOQ exception to Title VII).
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exception to liability for a BFOQ, the ADEA includes an exception
when the challenged employment practice is based on a reasonable
167
factor other than age. In Smith, Justice Stevens argued that the
inclusion of the RFOA provision in the ADEA and the lack of an
equivalent provision in Title VII justify narrower availability of a
disparate impact theory of liability under the ADEA.168 There is,
however, an explanation for the inclusion of the RFOA provision that
rebuts this argument. Age, unlike race, sex, national origin, and the
other groups protected under Title VII, changes over time.169 As
discussed in Part III.B, at least some factors protected by Title VII
are more likely to be BFOQs than age. In comparison to the statuses
protected under Title VII, age is much more likely to serve as a proxy
170
for a job qualification that could be defined as a BFOQ. This
difference between groups protected under Title VII and individuals
over the age of forty who are protected under the ADEA explains the
inclusion of the RFOA provision.
Finally, the Court’s broad interpretation of what qualifies as a
“reasonable factor other than age” is inconsistent with its purported
reliance on EEOC regulations. Both Justice Stevens in the plurality
and Justice Scalia in his concurrence claim that the EEOC’s
171
regulations regarding the ADEA warrant deference from the Court.
Justices Stevens and Scalia also defer to the EEOC with regard to
their decision that the ADEA supports a disparate impact theory of
liability.172 However, when addressing the issue of the scope of the
RFOA, both Justice Stevens and Justice Scalia seem to ignore the
EEOC’s description of the RFOA provision.
The EEOC has consistently stated that the business necessity test
is the proper test for evaluating a reasonable factor other than age.

167.
168.
169.

See Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (2000).
Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 233 (2005).
Title VII does not recognize race as a bona fide occupational qualification. MARION G.
CRAIN ET AL., WORKLAW 567 (2005).
170. Many characteristics that are closely correlated with age, such as mobility, hearing, and
eyesight, could easily be BFOQs.
171. Smith, 544 U.S. at 239–40 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion); id. at 245 (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
172. See id. at 240 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion) (“The text of the statute . . ., the RFOA
provision, and the EEOC regulations all support [the availability of disparate-impact
liability].”); id. at 245 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[T]he EEOC’s reasonable view that the ADEA
authorizes disparate-impact claims is deserving of deference.”).
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The EEOC’s interpretation of the RFOA provision in the Code of
Federal Regulations reads:
When an employment practice, including a test, is claimed as a basis
for different treatment of employees or applicants for employment
on the grounds that it is a ‘factor other than’ age, and such a practice
has an adverse impact on individuals within the protected age group,
173
it can only be justified as a business necessity.

Furthermore, the EEOC explained that it had specifically rewritten
the regulation “to make it clear that employment criteria that are ageneutral on their face but which nevertheless have a disparate impact
on members of the protected age group must be justified as a business
necessity.”174
Disparate impact claims under the ADEA should succeed less
often than disparate impact claims brought under Title VII. Age is
more likely to be strongly correlated with a legitimate job
qualification than race, religion or sex. The standards, however, that
courts use in evaluating those claims should be the same. Age is more
likely to be legitimately related to job performance than the statuses
protected under Title VII.175 But the approach that the Smith Court
took regarding the RFOA provision has essentially barred nearly all
disparate impact claims under the ADEA. The business necessity test
used for disparate impact claims under Title VII could, however,
allow for the legitimate difference between age and other statuses.
For example, a requirement that employees have certain physical
abilities could easily have a disparate impact on older employees, but
that impact could be justified as a business necessity. In contrast,
decisions not to hire employees who are more senior due to their
higher salaries, which would also likely have a disparate impact on
older employees, would be much harder to justify under the business
necessity test, “which asks whether there are other ways for the
employer to achieve its goals that do not result in a disparate impact
on a protected class.”176 Thus, using the business necessity test, those
employment qualifications that are crucial to a particular occupation
could be protected, even if they did have a disparate impact on older
173. 29 C.F.R. § 1625.7(d) (2004).
174. 46 Fed. Reg. 47725 (Sept. 29, 1981) (citing Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424
(1971) and Laugesen v. Anaconda Corp., 510 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1975)).
175. For example, age is likely to be highly correlated with eyesight or mobility, which could
be legitimate job qualifications.
176. Smith, 544 U.S. at 243.
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workers, while preserving the effectiveness of the disparate impact
theory of liability for plaintiffs.
CONCLUSION
The decision in Smith v. City of Jackson definitively established
177
that the ADEA supports a disparate impact theory of liability. But,
with that decision, the Court also severely limited the availability of
disparate impact claims by announcing an employer-friendly standard
for evaluating the “reasonable factor other than age” provision. As a
result, a decision that was an apparent victory for employees also
announced limitations that have made it difficult for a plaintiff to
prevail on a disparate impact claim under the ADEA.178 In
announcing those limitations, the Court provided an interpretation of
disparate impact claims under the ADEA that is inconsistent with a
proper reading of the statute.

177. Id. at 240.
178. See generally Benjes, supra note 142 (arguing that the Court’s decision in Smith may
vitiate plaintiffs’ ability to prevail on disparate impact claims).

